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A THINKER-BASED APPROACH TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Seana Valentine Shiffrin*
INTRODUCTION
Many contemporary autonomy theories of freedom of
speech champion the perspective and freedom of just one side of
the communicative relation—usually, the speaker or the
listener(s). Such approaches seem to neglect or subordinate the
autonomy interests of the other relevant parties. Other
autonomy theories do not privilege one perspective on the
communicative relation over another, but strangely treat the
speakers’ interests and the listeners’ autonomy interests as
rather discrete entities—disparate constituents both demanding
our attention. Both strands gloss over a source of justification for
free speech that both connects the two perspectives and
recognizes the wider foundations that underpin their value (by
contrast with the more narrow connections drawn between them
by democracy theories). Specifically, both approaches celebrate
one or more external manifestations of thought but do not focus
on the source of speech and cognition—namely the thinker
herself—and the conditions necessary for freedom of thought. I
submit that a more plausible autonomy theory of freedom of
speech arises from taking the free thinker as the central figure in
a free speech theory. We should understand freedom of speech
as, centrally, protecting freedom of thought.
Hence, in this essay, I propose to sketch a particular sort of
autonomy theory of freedom of speech, namely a thinker-based
foundation for freedom of speech. Although this account does
not capture all of the values of freedom of speech or yield a
* Professor of Philosophy and Pete Kameron Professor of Law and Social Justice,
UCLA. For enlightening criticism and commentary, I am grateful to Mark Greenberg,
Jeffrey Helmreich, Barbara Herman, Heidi Kitrosser, Terry Stedman, participants in the
Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, the Princeton Program in Ethics and Public Affairs
and my free speech seminars at UCLA, and, of course, the members of the free speech
discussion group from which this paper originates, especially Ed Baker and Steve
Shiffrin. Terry Stedman also provided invaluable research assistance.
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comprehensive theory of freedom of speech, a thinker-based
foundation can provide a stronger and more coherent
foundation for the most important free speech protections than
rival free speech theories, including the more common speaker1
based or listener-based autonomy theories.
In saying a thinker-based foundation undergirds the most
important free speech protections, I mean ‘most important’ in a
normative sense, and not in the sense that they are necessarily
acknowledged as such, or at all, in contemporary free speech
2
doctrine. My paper aims to identify strong theoretical
foundations for the protection of free speech but not to provide
the best theoretical account of our system or our current practices
3
of protecting (or failing to protect, as the case may be) free
speech. Articulating a theory of free speech along the former,
more ideal, lines provides us with a framework to assess whether
our current practices are justified or not, as well as which ones
are outliers. An ideal theoretical approach also supplies both a
measure for reform and some structural components to form the
framework to assess new sorts of cases.

1. I have explored some aspects of a thinker-based approach in prior work. See
Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433 (Michael Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009); Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, WhatIis Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 839 (2005) [hereinafter Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled
Association?]. I do not mean to represent Vince as endorsing the general thinkeroriented approach I outline above, however. Some other authors have explored aspects
of thinker-based approaches as well, although from different angles and with different
emphases. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY 95–123 (2007); TIMOTHY
MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 1–32 (2006); SUSAN WILLIAMS, TRUTH,
AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 130–229
(2004); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First
Amendment and the Scientific Method, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1479; Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating
Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1997). See also Immanuel Kant, What is
Orientation in Thinking?, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 237, 247 (Hans Reiss ed., trans.
H.B. Nisbet, 2d ed. 1991). Although Ed Baker’s writing often suggests a speaker-based
approach, in email correspondence about a draft of this paper he indicated that his true
sympathies lay with a thinker-based approach. E-mail from Ed Baker to Seana Shiffrin
(Feb. 13, 2009) (on file with author).
2. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV.
549 (2011) (defending a normative approach to free speech theory that does not take
explanation of extant doctrine as foundational).
3. One free speech howler from the 2009 term around which I would not care to
tailor a free speech theory is Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730–
31 (2010) (upholding congressional prohibition of assistance to designated terrorist
organizations, including its application to mere speech that provides advice on how to
petition the U.N. or how to use legal means to resolve conflicts peacefully).
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Which freedom of speech protections figure among the
most important is, of course, contested. My position in that
debate is that a decent regime of freedom of speech must
provide a principled and strong form of protection for political
speech and, in particular, for incendiary speech and other forms
of dissent, for religious speech, for fiction, art—whether abstract
or representational—and music, for diaries and other forms of
discourse meant primarily for self-consumption, and for that
private speech and discourse, e.g. personal conversations and
letters, crucial to developing, pursuing, and maintaining personal
4
relationships.
Further, all of these forms of expression should enjoy
foundational protection, by which I mean there should not be a
lexical hierarchy of value between them, nor should the
protections for some depend dominantly on their playing an
instrumental role in securing the conditions for the flourishing
practice of another. To put it more pointedly, an adequate free
speech theory will avoid the convolutions associated with the
more narrow democracy theories of freedom of speech and their
efforts to explain why abstract art and music should gain free
speech protection. Although a case could be made that the
freedom to compose and to listen to Stravinsky is important to
developing the sort of open personal and cultural character
necessary for democracy to flourish or that it feeds the
“sociological structure that is prerequisite for the formation of
5
public opinion,” that justification is strained and bizarrely
6
indirect. In any case, the right of Stravinsky to compose and of
4. These are, of course, theoretically informed, provisional starting points that
strike me as highly intuitive, secure, illuminating, and important lodestars. Nonetheless, if
a plausible theory cannot be found that supports and explains these judgments or if a
more plausible theory would reject them for good reason, these judgments should be
revised or discarded. That is, I regard their identification as just an early step in a process
aimed at achieving reflective equilibrium and not as fixed or immutable ‘results’ that
must be accommodated, no matter what the other theoretical costs. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–21, 46–53 (Original ed. 1971) (discussing reflective equilibrium).
Further, the argument that follows does not, largely, use these starting points as
premises. So, subscription to these starting points is not a precondition for the
argument’s success; it is merely that their accommodation and explanation seems to be
desiderata of a satisfactory theory.
5. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477,
486 (2011).
6. Jim Weinstein offers a refreshingly candid admission of this difficulty. James
Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 499 n.45 (2011). No more successful is the argument that
democracy theories will protect the arts because to understand one another and to form a
conception about what should be a public matter, we must have access to the forms of
expression others engage in and deem important. See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory
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audiences to listen (or to cringe in non-comprehension) should
not depend upon whether The Rite of Spring breeds democrats
or fascists, or whether it supports, detracts from, or is
7
superfluous to a democratic culture.
A good free speech theory should identify a non-contingent
and direct foundation for its protection. On the other hand,
protection for commercial and non-press, business corporate
speech is a less central matter, one that reasonably may involve
weaker protections and may reasonably rely heavily on more
instrumental concerns. A good free speech theory should explain
why commercial and business corporate speech may be different

Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 621 (2011) (“So
long as Brokeback Mountain, and indeed all forms of communication that sociologically
we recognize as art, form part of the process by which society ponders what it believes
and thinks, it is protected under a theory of the First Amendment that stresses
democratic participation.”) This justification is circuitous. It is parasitic upon others’
developing the art form (which now we must have access to in order to understand them
and their preferences) but either: does not provide foundational support for their
freedom to develop it, or if it does, the argument lacks a fundamentally and specifically
democratic form that is independent of and logically prior to an appeal to the interests of
the autonomous thinker.
7. Joshua Cohen offers a far less narrow democratic account of free expression,
one grounded in his deliberative democratic approach. His approach shows sensitivity to
the interests of the citizen qua thinker and his approach provides a more plausible
grounding for art, religious speech, erotic speech, and other forms of speech that are not
explicitly or even indirectly political. Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 207 (1993), reprinted in JOSHUA COHEN, PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY 98, 114–
20 (2009) [hereinafter Cohen, Freedom of Expression]; Joshua Cohen, Democracy and
Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185 (Jon Elster ed., 1998), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, supra, at 223, 248–54 [hereinafter Cohen, Democracy and Liberty];
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67
(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS,
DEMOCRACY, supra, at 16, 32–34 [hereinafter Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy].
Although our approaches are fairly congenial, Cohen’s case for rights of personal,
non-political expression is usually voiced in terms of what the citizen “reasonably takes
to be compelling considerations” or “substantial reasons” for expression (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Cohen, Freedom of Expression, supra note 7, at 115–17; Cohen,
Democracy and Liberty, supra note 7, at 248–50. By contrast, I find unnecessary and
over-demanding his stress upon agents’ having substantial, compelling or obligatory
reasons for their particular expression. Putting aside the peculiarly intense drive of the
single-minded artist, many citizens’ reasons for most of their speech, including a variety
of images, melodies, artistic or quotidian thoughts, lack that charge. Nonetheless, in my
view, they present no weaker of a case for protection. My aim is to develop an approach
that does not rely on the idea that particular, personal expression is protected because its
expression reasonably presents itself as akin to, or on a spectrum with, felt obligations of
the speaker, interference of which would be unreasonable by the polity, but rather, an
approach that is fully consistent with the admission that much personal and artistic
speech is banal and unimportant in the grand scheme of things. A broader focus on the
condition of the thinker, rather than on the (perceived) significance of the expression,
seems better able to satisfy that desideratum.

!!SEANASHIFFRIN-272-THINKERBASEDAPPROACH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

A THINKER-BASED APPROACH

10/17/2011 9:15 AM

287

and why arguing for their protection may be a less
straightforward matter.
Briefly put, I believe these desiderata are best satisfied by a
thinker-based free speech theory that takes to be central the
individual agent’s interest in the protection of the free
development and operation of her mind. Legal materials (by
which I mean to encompass laws, regulations, court rulings, and
resolutions) and government activity inconsistent with valuing
this protection are inconsistent with a commitment to freedom
of speech. In my view, legal materials or activity may be
inconsistent with valuing this protection in three main ways: (1)
the legal materials or the government activity may, on their face,
ban or attempt to ban the free development and operation of a
person’s mind or those activities or materials necessary for its
free development and operation; (2) the effect of the legal
materials, or of the activity, may objectionably interfere with the
free development and operation of a person’s mind; (3) the
rationale for the materials, or the activity, may be inconsistent
8
with valuing this protection.
In developing this position I will proceed from the
assumption that, for the most part, we are individual human
agents with significant (though importantly imperfect) rational
capacities, emotional capacities, perceptual capacities and
capacities of sentience—all of which exert influence upon each
9
other. I will also assume that our possession and exercise of
these capacities correctly constitute the core of what we value
about ourselves.
I will not say much to defend these assumptions. I do not
regard them as especially controversial. (To address the

8. See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1135, 1164–71 (2003).
9. In some of us, these capacities are fledgling, partial, or compromised.
Nonetheless, agents with them have an interest in their development and operation.
Although the degree of development and future potential may make some difference in
some cases and contexts, I do not think that, at base, a free speech theory delivers
fundamentally different results depending upon whether we are discussing children, the
mentally disabled, those suffering dementia, or fully formed adults. The most salient
context in which degree of development might be thought normatively to make a
difference, the schoolroom, seems better explained by reference to time, place, and
manner restrictions than to the developmental level of children. This, of course, is a
normative claim and one that does not entirely square with doctrinal developments over
the last twenty years. For discussions of children and the First Amendment, see Blasi &
Shiffrin, supra note 1; Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for
Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2004) See generally Symposium, Do Children Have
the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004).
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concerns of those who disagree would require a longer
digression than seems appropriate here.) Indeed, many popular
theories of freedom of speech only make sense if the individual
mind and the autonomy of its operation (a notion I will say more
about below) are valued and treated with respect. If we did not
regard the autonomy of the individual mind as important, it is
hard to see why we would value its expression or outputs in the
way and to the degree that truth theories or democratic theories
value speech. The same holds true of speaker-based and listener10
based theories. Still, each theory shares the presupposition that
the autonomous thinker fundamentally matters; speaker,
listener, and democracies theories start from an intermediate
point and hone in on one activity of the thinker, rather than on
the thinker herself. Reasoning from the standpoint of the thinker
and her interests can yield a more comprehensive, unified
foundation for much of the freedom of speech protection than is
yielded by starting from a more partial intermediate point.
My aim in what follows is to show the supportive connection
between valuing ourselves as so described and: (1) valuing
speech; (2) valuing freedom of speech; (3) regarding speech as, in
some politically and legally normative respects, special. With
respect to this last item, contra Fred Schauer, I deny that an
autonomy theory of free speech must show that speech is special
or unique with respect to its relation to autonomy, in order to
justify strong protections for freedom of speech. It may succeed
at that justificatory project while articulating values that cast a
11
broader net encompassing other forms of autonomous activity.
Indeed, I regard it as a general strength of autonomy theories
that they explain the continuity between speech protections and
rights of intimate association. But, although the plausibility of a
theory of strong protections for freedom of speech does not
depend upon its showing that speech is special, nonetheless, I do
think speech occupies a special place in the life and politically
germane needs of the autonomous thinker. It is worth showing
how it is both special and, at the same time, how it connects to
other autonomy interests.

10. Some purely instrumental theories of freedom of speech that focus on the
importance of controlling the excesses of state authority may differ on this point.
11. Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1984).
Some of Post’s criticisms of autonomy theories of freedom of speech appear to be
versions of the complaint that such theories cannot explain why speech is special. See
Post, supra note 5, at 479–81, 484, 487.
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AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Having stated my aspirations, let me move on to the
argument. I begin with an explicit, albeit perhaps partial,
elaboration of the interests of autonomous thinkers.
If we do value ourselves as rational agents with the
capacities previously described, then I submit we should
recognize a more articulated (though sometimes overlapping)
list of interests that emerge from our possession of these
valuable capacities.
Namely, every individual, rational, human agent qua thinker
has interests in:
a. A capacity for practical and theoretical thought.
Each agent has an interest in developing her mental
capacities to be receptive of, appreciative of, and responsive to
reasons and facts in practical and theoretical thought, i.e. to be
aware of and appropriately responsive to the true, the false, and
the unknown.
b. Apprehending the true.
Each agent has an interest in believing and understanding
true things about herself, including the contents of her mind, and
the features and forces of the environment from which she
emerges and in which she interacts.
c. Exercising the imagination.
Rational agents also have interests in understanding and
intellectually exploring non-existent possible and impossible
environments. Such mental activities allow agents the ability to
conceive of the future and what could be. Further, the ability to
explore the non-existent and impossible provides an opportunity
for the exercise of the philosophical capacities and the other
12
parts of the imagination.
d. Becoming a distinctive individual.
Each agent has an interest in developing a personality and
engaging more broadly in a mental life that, while responsive to
reasons and facts, is distinguished from others’ personalities by
individuating features, emotions, reactions, traits, thoughts, and
experiences that contribute to a distinctive perspective that
embodies and represents each individual’s separateness as a
person.
12. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality,
112 YALE L.J. 1, 38–39 (2002).
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e. Moral agency.
Each agent has an interest in acquiring the relevant
knowledge base and character traits as well as forming the
relevant thoughts and intentions to comply with the
requirements of morality. (This interest, of course, may already
be contained in the previously articulated interests in developing
the capacity for practical and theoretical thought, apprehending
the true, and exercising the imagination (a-c)).
f. Responding authentically.
Each agent has an interest in pursuing (a-e) through
processes that represent free and authentic forms of internal
creation and recognition. By this, I mean roughly that rational
agents have an interest in forming thoughts, beliefs, practical
judgments, intentions and other mental contents on the basis of
reasons, perceptions, and reactions through processes that, in the
main and over the long term, are independent of distortive
influences. In saying these processes are independent of
distortive influences, I mean they do not follow a trajectory fully
or largely scripted by forces external to the person that are
distinct from the reasons and other features of the world to
which she is responding. This is the intellectual aspect of being
an autonomous agent. So too agents have an interest in revealing
and sharing these mental contents at their discretion, i.e. at the
time at which those contents seem to them correct, apt, or
representative of themselves as well to those to whom (and at
that time) such revelations and the relationship they forge seem
appropriate or desirable.
g. Living among others.
Each rational, human agent has an interest in living among
other social, autonomous agents who have the opportunities to
develop their capacities in like ways. Satisfaction of this interest
does not merely serve natural desires for companionship but
crucially enables other interests of the agent qua thinker to be
achieved, including the development and recognition of a
distinctive self and character, the acquisition and confirmation of
knowledge, and the development and exercise of moral agency.
h. Appropriate recognition and treatment.
Each agent has an interest in being recognized by other
agents for the person she is and having others treat her morally
well.
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This list may not be exhaustive, but I believe it identifies
some of the more foundational and central interests that agents
have, independent of their specific projects, interests, and
desires, but just in virtue of their capacities for thought, broadly
understood to include autonomous deliberation and reactions,
practical judgment, and moral relations. Briefly summarized,
these are interests in self-development, self-knowledge,
knowledge of others, others’ knowledge of and respect for
oneself, knowledge of the environments in which one interacts,
opportunities for the exercise of one’s intellectual capacities
including the imagination, and the intellectual prerequisites of
13
moral relations.
Speech, and free speech in particular, are necessary
conditions of the realization of these interests. First, given the
opacity of our minds to one another, speech and expression are
the only precise avenues by which one can be known as the
individual one is by others. If what makes one a distinctive
individual qua person is largely a matter of the contents of one’s
14
mind, to be known by others requires the ability to transmit the
contents of one’s mind to others. Although some information
about one’s thoughts and beliefs may be gleaned from
observation, such inferences are typically coarse-grained at best
and cannot track the detail and nuance of the inner life of the
observed. Communication of the contents of one’s mind
primarily through linguistic means, but also through pictorial, or
even musical representation, uniquely furthers the interest in
being known by others. It thereby also makes possible complex
15
forms of social life. Further, it helps to develop some of the
13. In other work, I have argued that it is a mandatory, central (and fully liberal)
aim of law to accommodate and facilitate individuals’ ability to engage in moral agency.
See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of
Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222–29 (2010) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Inducing Moral
Deliberation]; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. 708, 713–19 (2007) [hereinafter, Shiffrin, Divergence]. Although I have
mainly focused on other legal contexts of moral accommodation and facilitation, free
speech protections may represent the most important legal context for the legal support
of agents’ moral capacities. See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Association,
Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 324–26 (2007) [hereinafter
Shiffrin, Compelled Association].
14. I do not mean what individuates one as a creature. In that respect, physical
features including one’s genetic composition and perhaps other physical, non-mental
facts may be important.
15. This consideration figured large among the motivations behind Kant’s views
about truthfulness and lying. See Immanuel Kant, Of Ethical Duties Towards Others, and
Especially Truthfulness, in LECTURES ON ETHICS 200–209 (Peter Heath & J.B.
Schneewind eds., trans. Peter Heath, 1997). Of course, individuals may not fully know
themselves and, further, may be self-deceived. Hence, they may not be fully equipped to
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capacities prerequisite to moral agency because successful
communication demands having a sense of what others are in a
position to know and understand. Practicing communication
initiates the process of taking others’ perspective to understand
what others know and are in a position to grasp.
Being known by others as the distinct individual one is is
important in itself. It is also essential for one to be fully
respected by others. Further, having access to the contents of
others’ minds (at their discretion) is essential for being able to
respect them, at least insofar as some forms of respect and other
moral duties involve understanding and respecting individuals as
separate persons and in light of features of their individuality,
including their reasons, aims, and needs. Moreover, other forms
of moral activity, as well as appreciation of the moral activity of
others, require some recognition of agents’ motives.
Furthermore, I suspect that one cannot fully develop a
complex mental world, identify its contents, evaluate them, and
distinguish between those that are merely given and those one
endorses, unless one has the ability to externalize bits of one’s
mind, formally distance those bits from one’s mind, identify
them as particulars, and then evaluate them to either endorse,
reject, or modify them. For many people, some thoughts may
only be fully identified and known to themselves if made
linguistically or representationally explicit. Many find that
difficult to do using merely mental language, especially with
sufficiently complex ideas; one has to externalize what the
thoughts are through verbal or written speech or through other
forms of symbolic representation to identify them completely
(and sometimes to form them at all), a prerequisite to evaluating
their contents. Other thoughts and methods of tracking one’s
environment over time require some form of external
representation because of the frailties of the human memory; to
form the complex thought, one needs the device of external
16
representation to keep track of portions of it over time. The
ability and opportunity to generate external representations may
share all of the contents of their minds with others and to enable others fully to know
themselves directly through testimony. This does not diminish my point. Even when
people are self-deceived, what they take to be their beliefs, emotions and other mental
contents is an important aspect of who they are; further, sharing these contents with
others and confronting the reactions of others and their observations of one’s contrary
behavior is often crucial to resolving and eliminating self-ignorance and self-deception.
16. Tyler Burge, Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds: The Sixth
Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, 32 NOÛS SUPPL. 12 1, 10–13, 19–22, 27–28 (1998);
Tyler Burge, Memory and Persons, 112 PHIL. REV. 289, 300–03, 314–21 (2003).
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both make public what has already fully formed in the mind and
may render possible the formation of new sorts of thoughts that
17
cannot take full form in our limited mental space.
Of course, it is not merely the development and
identification of one’s thoughts that requires the use of
representation and external articulation. To pursue our interest
in forming true beliefs about ourselves and our environment, we
need the help of others’ insights and beliefs, as well as their
reactions and evaluative responses to our beliefs. Others can
only have the basis for responding, and the means to respond
with the sort of precision necessary to be helpful, if they are able
to use speech.
My argument that rational human thinkers need access to
other thinkers under conditions in which their mental contents
may be known with some degree of precision, explicitly
recognized as such, and reacted to, is partially but poignantly
confirmed by the evidence of the disastrous effects of
involuntary solitary confinement. Prisoners in solitary
confinement deteriorate mentally and emotionally. They
progressively lose their grip on reality, suffering hallucinations
18
and paranoia, and many become psychotic. “Human beings rely
on social contact with others to test and validate their
perceptions of the environment. Ultimately, a complete lack of
social contact makes it difficult to distinguish what is real from
19
what is not or what is external from what is internal.” Prisoners
subject to solitary confinement suffer terrible depression, despair
and anxiety; moreover, their emotional control and stability
20
wane and their abilities to interact with others atrophy.
Of course, prisoners in solitary confinement endure more
than just the lack of conversation and the absence of
interlocutors; they lack fundamental forms of control over their
lives, other sorts of interactions with persons, and other forms of
17. See also MACKLEM, supra note 1, at 1–32.
18. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects
of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and
Recommending What Should Change, 52 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 622, 627 (2008); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term
Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130–32 (2003).
19. Arrigo & Bullock, supra note 18, at 7 (citing the work of Haney, supra note 18).
Similar evidence presents itself about the effects of uncorrected hearing loss. Stig
Arlinger, Negative Consequences of Uncorrected Hearing Loss: A Review, 42 INT’L J. OF
AUDIOLOGY 2S17, 2S17–20 (2003) (reporting that hearing loss may reduce intellectual
and cultural stimulation, give rise to changes in the central nervous system, and may
affect the development of dementia).
20. See Haney, supra note 18.
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perceptual access to reality. But, most other prisoners lack this
sort of control and lack broader forms of access to the world and
yet do not suffer the degree of devastation to mental function
21
that prisoners in solitary confinement do. “Whether in Walpole
or Beirut or Hanoi, all human beings experience isolation as
22
torture.” What seems to push them over the edge is the absence
of regular, bilateral communication. My worry is that to forbid
or substantially to restrict free expression is not tantamount to
solitary incarceration but lies on a spectrum with it: it is to
institute a sort of solitary confinement outside of prison but
within one’s mind.
So, in short, the view I am attracted to is that it is essential
to the appropriate development and regulation of the self, and of
one’s relation to others, that one have wide-ranging access to the
opportunity to externalize one’s mental contents, to have the
opportunity to make one’s mental contents known to others in
an unscripted and authentic way, and that one has protection
from unchosen interference with one’s mental contents from
processes that would disrupt or disable the operation of these
processes. That is to say, free speech is essential to the
development and proper functioning of thinkers.
Further, because moral agency involves the ability to take
the perspective of other people and to respond to their
distinctive features as individuals, including some of their mental
contents, then free speech also plays a foundational and
necessary (though not sufficient) role in ensuring citizens
develop the capacity for moral agency and have the
opportunities and information necessary to discharge their moral
duties. Politically, these arguments should resonate with us,
yielding an argument for constitutional protection for freedom
of speech, both from respect for the fundamental moral rights of
the person and also because, as I have argued elsewhere, a wellfunctioning system of social cooperation and justice presupposes
that the citizenry, by and large, have active, well-developed
23
moral personalities. The successful operation of a democratic
polity, as well as its meaningfulness, would also seem to depend

21. See id. at 125.
22. Atul Gawande, Hellhole, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36 (emphasis
added).
23. Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation, supra note 13, at 1231–32. See also JOHN
STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 24–25 (Currin
Shields ed., 1958); RAWLS, supra note 4, at 395–587.

!!SEANASHIFFRIN-272-THINKERBASEDAPPROACH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

A THINKER-BASED APPROACH

10/17/2011 9:15 AM

295

upon citizens’ generally having strong and independent
capacities for thought and judgment.
This view makes no important distinction, at the foundations, between communication about aesthetics, one’s medical
24
condition and treatment, one’s regard for another, one’s
sensory perceptions, the sense or lack thereof of the existence of
a God, or one’s political beliefs. All of these communications
serve the fundamental function of allowing an agent to transmit
(or attempt to transmit so far as possible) the contents of her
mind to others and to externalize her mental contents in order to
attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse or react to given
contents as authentically her own; further, they allow others to
be granted access to the information necessary to appreciate the
thinker, on voluntary terms, and to forge a full human relation
with her. One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically
and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than
thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends; insofar as a
central function of free speech is to allow for the development,
exercise, and recognition of the self, there is no reason to
relegate the representation of thoughts about personal relations
or self-reflection to a lesser or secondary category. Pictorial
representations and music (and not merely discourse about
them) should also gain foundational protection because they also
represent the externalization of mental contents, contents that
may not be accurately or well-captured through linguistic means;
after all, not all thoughts are discursive or may be fully captured
25
through discursive description.
24. Respect for this right is far from a given. Prita Mulyasari was recently
incarcerated in Indonesia for three weeks of pre-trial detention on charges of internet
defamation after she sent an email to friends complaining about a wrongful diagnosis at a
local hospital. After an international campaign in her defense, she was acquitted but the
government is appealing her acquittal and seeking a 6 month prison sentence. See
Norimitsu Onishi, Trapped Inside a Broken Judicial System after Hitting Send, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at A6; Turning Critics Into Criminals: The Human Rights
Consequences of Criminal Defamation Law in Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 5,
26–28 (May 2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/90023 (discussing other criminal
defamation cases for other consumer complaints).
Indonesia imposes criminal penalties for defamation, enhancing them if the
communication is sent over the internet. Truth, on its own, is not a standard defense.
Whether it is permitted at all seems to be a matter of the judge’s discretion. Further,
defendants seeking to use the truth defense in cases not involving public officials must
bear the burden of proof and must show that the defamatory statement was offered from
necessity or ‘in the general interest.’ Pursuing an unsuccessful truth defense may subject
the defendant to an even harsher sentence of up to four years in prison. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 24, at 16–17.
25. See e.g., Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, 32 PHIL. Q. 127, 128–30, 133–36
(1982); Frank Jackson, What Mary Didn’t Know, 83 J. PHIL. 291 (1986).
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On the other hand, this approach can render sensible the
notions that non-press, business corporate and commercial
speech may be different and that their protection may assume a
weaker form, resting upon separate, more context-dependent
26
and instrumental foundations. First, business corporate speech
does not involve in any direct or straightforward fashion the
27
revelation of individuals’ mental contents. Corporate-tocorporate as well as corporate-to-individual speech often bear
only an indirect relation to the revelation and development of
the thinker or the intellectual, emotional, or moral relations
between thinkers. Of course, thinkers may have an interest in
access to corporate speech because corporate and commercial
speech may report information about one’s given environment,
but, in other circumstances, the point of corporate speech, as
well as other commercial speech, is to alter the environment, e.g.
to manufacture desire, not to report it.
To be sure, however, altering the environment is also the
aim of advocacy speech by individuals as well. That aim in no
way diminishes the protection that should be afforded to it.
Advocacy speech represents a form of exercise of thinkers’
interests in developing their moral agency and in treating one
another well by attempting to discern and to persuade others of
what each of us or what we together should think and do. By
contrast, non-press, business corporate and commercial speech,
by design, issue from an environment whose structure does not
facilitate and, indeed, tends to discourage the authentic
expression of individuals’ judgment. As Ed Baker has argued,
the competitive structure of the economic market and the
narrowly defined aims of the corporate or commercial entity
place substantial pressures on the content of corporate and
commercial speech. So too may the internal structural design of

26. For one example of its context-dependence on other features of the economic
climate and our system of economic regulation, see Shiffrin, Compelled Association,
supra note 13, at 324, 327.
27. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between corporations and human
beings and the distance between corporate speech and any individual points of view); C.
Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 987–89
(2009) (stressing that commercial corporations are limited forms of entities created for
instrumental reasons and that the people who operate within them do not act fully
autonomously); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation:
Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1246
(1983) (discussing the structure of the corporation and the distance between its speech
and the views of its shareholders).
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the corporation. In Baker’s view, their content has a ‘forced
profit orientation,’ and does not represent a ‘manifestation of
29
individual freedom or choice’; in my somewhat weaker terms,
external environmental pressures render more tenuous any
charitable presupposition that such speech is sincere, authentic,
or the product of autonomous processes. As I have argued
elsewhere, Baker’s starkly-put position may involve a degree of
over-generalization given market imperfections, market actors
who are true believers, and market actors using the market and
30
speech within it to further external and sincere moral goals.
Nonetheless, I concur with him that the market’s structure tends
“very strongly [to] determine [corporate and commercial] speech
31
content.” These distortive influences render more precarious
the claims that strong presumptions against speech regulation in
this domain reliably serve the interests of the thinker-quaspeaker or the thinker-qua-listener as the recipient of such
communications. Together, these considerations provide reason
to treat non-press, business corporate and commercial speech as
non-standard cases within a free speech domain and justifiably,
depending on context and content, often to treat such speech as
permissible targets of a more comprehensive scheme of
32
economic regulation.
COMPARING A THINKER-BASED APPROACH TO
OTHER AUTONOMY APPROACHES
This approach, one that showcases freedom of thought and
the needs of thinkers as such as the central theme of a free
speech perspective, is compatible with many of the traditional
insights associated with speaker-based and listener-based
theories (and with democracy and truth theories for that matter).
All of these approaches, however, work from an overly narrow
foundation or they start by valorizing one manifestation of free
28. See Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 1247.
29. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196, 204
(1989); C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004); Baker, supra note
27, at 985–87.
30. See Shiffrin, Compelled Association, supra note 13, at 320.
31. Id.
32. See also Baker, supra note 27, at 994. I have assumed throughout this part of the
discussion that the government’s motives in regulating commercial or business corporate
speech would be permissible ones, that is to say that they were not driven by a rationale
that is inconsistent with valuing the autonomous operation of the mind. The requirement
that the government’s rationale must be a permissible one, as I specify above, is not
suspended in this domain (or any other).
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thought, while neglecting other manifestations that are no less
important. Although the ability to externalize one’s mental
contents through speech is of prime importance on this account,
it would make no sense to give it pride of place over ensuring
that others could listen or take in these transmissions or over the
protection of one’s rational processes from interference or
disruption.
Because this account derives the basic free speech
protection from the foundational interests of the autonomous
agent qua thinker, it therefore, rests on sparer assumptions than
other autonomy accounts, such as Ed Baker’s, that revolve
33
around the autonomous agent qua self-governor. Whether in its
substantive form (the agent as a person with the capacity “to
pursue successfully the life she endorses”) or its formal
conception (the agent with “the authority to make decisions
34
about her own meaningful actions [and resources]”), Baker’s
ideal invokes an attractive model towards which to aspire, but
utilizes unnecessarily controversial assumptions.
For instance, I do not believe that the autonomy case for
protecting free speech hinges upon whether we have (or should
have or should value) the full panoply of executive skills and
control over our actions that the broader ideal of self-authorship
and self-governance involves. We may have all the interests I
identify (along with their capacities to pursue them) even if we
lack the ability or authority to implement our decisions.
Rightfully detained prisoners will lack both these features but, in
35
my view (if not the Court’s), enjoy the relevant moral right of

33. See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 29, at 47–
69; Baker, supra note 27, at 990 (identifying autonomy in terms of embodying values in
action). See generally Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
251 (2011) [hereinafter Baker, Autonomy].
34. See Edwin Baker, Autonomy, supra note 33, at 253, 54.
35. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530–33 (2006) (plurality opinion) (upholding
ban on access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs by prisoners in the
most restrictive level of incarceration); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen
a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
548–52 (1979) (upholding ban on pretrial detainees receiving hardback books by mail
unless sent directly by the publisher or a bookstore); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129–33 (1977) (upholding ban on bulk mailing and inmate-toinmate solicitation to join prisoner’s union); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–28
(1974) (upholding ban on prisoners initiating interviews with the press). For critical
commentary on the low protection afforded to prisoners’ First Amendment rights see
James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights,
10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97 (2006); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120
HARV. L. REV. 125, 263 (2006).
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freedom of speech. Skepticism about the broader ideal therefore
should not impugn the more narrowly tailored, thinker-centered
36
case for free speech protections. Further, a thinker-based
approach is better positioned to undergird a more expansive free
speech protection, or at least to do so in a more direct and
obvious fashion, because our imagination and thoughts range
more widely than our capacity for self-governance and selfauthorship (at least if the latter is construed to involve selfregarding action and conduct). We are able to think and
consider topics and subjects that have no specific and direct
relation to ourselves and our pursuit of a life we endorse.
Explicitly making the thinker the central figure of free
speech (as compared to focusing on the listener, the speaker, the
self-governor or the functioning of the polity) may make a
difference as far as what dangers and threats to free speech
present themselves as salient. So, for example, although I find
Tim Scanlon’s emphasis on sovereignty of deliberation in the
Millian principle at the center of his early listener-based theory
highly congenial, its focus on the listener may distract us from
equally significant forms of regulation that tamper with the
sovereignty of deliberation but that are not directly targeted at
37
interfering with a speaker-listener relation. Scanlon’s Millian
principle states:
[C]ertain harms which, although they would not occur but for
certain acts of expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as part
of a justification for legal restrictions . . . (a) harms to certain
individuals which consist in their coming to have false beliefs
as a result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful
consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of
expression, where the connection between [them] consists
merely in the . . . expression le[a]d[ing] the agents to
38
believe . . . these acts to be worth performing.

36. Further, arguing just from the foundational interests of the thinker as such does
not elicit the same worries regarding why speech in particular merits special, strong
protection.
37. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204 (1972) reprinted in T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 6, 14–15
(2003). Scanlon subsequently criticized the Millian principle on other grounds than I
explore here and embraced a modified, but broader, theory of freedom of speech that,
inter alia, offers primary recognition to speaker and audience interests. T.M. Scanlon, Jr.,
Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979),
reprinted in SCANLON, supra, at 84.
38. Scanlon, supra note 37, at 213.
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Although the insulation of the agent’s opportunity to form
beliefs and opinions of her own is central to the thinker-based
perspective, Scanlon’s Millian principle—as stated—has its
limitations as a form of protection of the thinker. From a
freedom of thought perspective, such a principle is under39
inclusive in an important respect. It is unclear why we should
protect only autonomous or authentic processes from efforts to
interfere with belief and conclusion formation. Should we not
also ensure that regulations are not propounded on the grounds
that speech will yield emotional reactions of one sort or another
or that speech will induce sensory reactions of one sort or
another? Aren’t these processes also central to human thought
at least?
Moreover, Scanlon’s principle only reaches and condemns
regulation aimed at preventing the formation of false beliefs and
practical judgments as consequences of expression. It does not
directly speak to the wrongfulness of regulations or government
activity aimed at instilling beliefs, attitudes, or reasons through
compulsion, subliminal manipulation, or other efforts to
circumvent rational deliberation.
Finally, it doesn’t directly recognize the significance that
assuming the role of speaker may have to an agent’s own
rational development and cognition. Expanding the theory to
correct these forms of under-inclusion would not be, I take it,
40
antithetical to the spirit of Scanlon’s original approach.
Nonetheless, an explicitly thinker-oriented approach more
naturally yields a comprehensive explanation of what is
troubling about thought control, efforts at thought control, as
well as other sorts of efforts to disrupt the free operation of the

39. The Millian principle may be overinclusive in the following respect: the
principle as stated does not provide a clear line to distinguish between false beliefs that
result from fraud or intentional misrepresentation and false beliefs that result from
sincere communication (but poor judgment, understanding or perception on the part of
the speaker or the listener). The former may reasonably count as harms, I submit, on the
grounds that a thinker-based view of freedom of speech provides no foundational
protection for speech that aims to distort and control the thinker’s rational processes of
tracking and understanding her environment. Again, I doubt Scanlon would be hostile to
this distinction, as suggested by his apparent friendliness to at least some sorts of
defamation actions, id. at 209, and his later criticism in Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression of the Millian principle for failing to allow laws on deceptive
advertising. Scanlon, Jr., supra note 37, at 532. As originally stated, though, the Millian
principle does not clearly make room for defamation liability.
40. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 37, at 91–92 (observing the audience’s interest
“in having a good environment for the formation of one’s beliefs and desires” and
offering criticisms of subliminal speech).
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mind, whether or not such efforts also happen to operate
through a mode of interfering interpersonal communication.
For example, as Vince Blasi and I argued at greater length
41
elsewhere, focusing on freedom of thought as such may yield a
more straightforward account of the protection in West Virginia
42
State Board of Education v. Barnette. It is not clear that the
compelled pledge, so long as its origins are transparent, restricts
listener opportunities, nor does its motivation violate strictures
on respecting listeners and their deliberative capacities. Further,
although it seems clear that the compelled pledge violates the
free speech rights of the party who must speak the pledge, it is
less clear that the standard themes that have occupied speakeroriented theories are squarely engaged here. So long as it is clear
the pledge is compelled and so long as the speaker may disavow
the pledge, the speaker’s ability to express herself faithfully is
43
arguably not seriously abridged. The speaker will not be
misunderstood by reasonable observers. Although reciting
others’ speech may not be a part of one’s project of self-creation,
so long as others’ uptake isn’t disrupted and so long as the
compelled speech is not especially time consuming, focusing on
the speaker—as such—seems strained. A more straightforward

41. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 1.
42. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43. Of course, the necessity of correcting a false impression conveyed to an
audience that does not understand the significance of the speech being compelled may
impinge upon the speaker’s interest in remaining silent with respect to the pledge and the
sentiments and commitments expressed therein; necessarily, the interests in selfexpression must include the ability to gather one’s thoughts and engage in self-creation at
one’s own pace. There is something to this point but I am not sure that it carries enough
significance to bear the full weight of the Barnette protection. Correcting a misimpression
only requires explaining the significance or fact of compulsion; it does not require the
speaker to make up her mind or reveal anything substantive about the pledge. This point,
however, may be less persuasive in contexts in which any sort of correction or
explanation may implicitly reveal some reservations about the pledge and such
revelations would be socially or politically dangerous. Still, I assume the Barnette
protection holds even for compelled speech that is less fraught or that is compelled in less
charged contexts. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
In any case, it is unclear how much of the substance, whether the positive protection
or the negative limits, of the First Amendment protection should revolve around how
unreasonable people might interpret the significance of a speech performance. For
example, the fact that unreasonable people might take my friend’s speech to represent
my own views and that their misunderstanding might prompt me to speak on a topic
about which I’d prefer to remain silent does not begin to ground an argument that I have
a right that my friend not speak in a way that may mislead the unreasonable interpreters.
The republishing libel doctrine also wanders a little too close for my comfort to the view
that the limits of the First Amendment may be dictated by the unreasonable reactions of
readers. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
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explanation would not focus predominantly on either side of the
speaker-audience relationship.
What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge is
that the motive behind the regulation, and the possible effect, is
to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the
compelled speaker. Significantly, the compelled speaker is also a
compelled listener and is compelled to adopt postures that
typically connote identification with her message. The aim, and I
believe the potential effect, is to try to influence the speaker to
associate herself with the message and implicitly to accept it, but
through means that bypass the deliberative faculties of the agent.
Compelled speech of this kind threatens (or at least aims) to
interfere with free thinking processes of the speaker/listener and
to influence mental content in ways and through methods that
are illicit: nontransparent, via repetition, and through coercive
manipulation of a character virtue, namely that of sincerity, that
itself is closely connected to commitments of freedom of speech.
Another advantage of a thinker-centered approach is that it
yields a distinctive approach to freedom of association that both
explains its centrality and depicts the relation between ‘intimate’
and ‘expressive’ as continuous. Again, the approach is not
antithetical to other theories of freedom of speech, e.g. speakerbased or listener-based theories. But, occupying a thinker-based
perspective may orient one more immediately to the centrality
of association than other theories which may lead one to value
association through a more circuitous route. Even once one
adopts a capacious view of the content covered by a free speech
norm, speaker-oriented theories have tended to think of the
point of associations as bundles of speakers who come together
to amplify their speech—to render it louder or to garner more
attention for their positions. The model has been to think of
speakers as having a prior message that brings them together
and that the associations facilitate more effective, clearer
communication of these ideas, formed prior to association. The
association is a conduit or a pass through: it enhances the
effectiveness of the message but plays little formative role with
respect to the actual speech.
A thinker-based view of the sort I have been sketching
identifies, at least more immediately, the role of associations in a
free speech theory. If, as a general matter, our intellectual
development and, indeed, our basic sanity depends upon our
communicative interaction with others, and, if we conceive of
the function of speech as critical to this development, we are
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more likely to be attuned to the ways that associations serve as
sites of idea formation and development, and to recognize the
ways in which the development (and not merely the
broadcasting) of content occurs through mutual collaboration
and mutual influence in explicit and implicit ways. Such an
approach would not focus predominantly on whether regulations
affect the message of an association but on whether regulations
interfere with the ability of associations to function as sites for
44
mutual cognitive influence.
WHAT MAKES SPEECH SPECIAL?
I observed earlier that it seems to me to be a positive
feature, rather than an embarrassment, of a speech theory that it
can show the compatibility of and even the continuity between
different core protections of individual autonomy. At the same
time, it does seem as though speech is special in some way. An
attractive free speech theory should draw some normative
distinction between speech as an exercise of autonomy and at
least some other behaviors that are exercises of autonomy;
although some forms of autonomous action should perhaps gain
the same high level of legal protection as free speech, not all
autonomous action should. An attractive free speech theory will
help to make some sense of the divide.
With respect to the first desideratum of making sense of the
continuity, it strikes me as a strength of the thinker-based
45
approach that it renders the penumbra theory of Griswold and
46
Roe sensible. First, certain substantive due process protections
provide the preconditions for a meaningful free speech
protection. If we accept the First Amendment and its
justifications and we accept that our form of rational agency
requires social connections to develop and flourish, then we
must provide for safe havens for thought, communication, and
mutual influence: the relevant forms of safety come both in
numbers (i.e. having associates with whom one may share
thoughts and who may witness what happens to one) and in the
ability to select with whom and in what ways one will share
fundamental forms of intimacy. If the state could prevent
intimate associations or if it could require them to occur
44. I develop an argument of this kind in greater detail in Shiffrin, What Is Really
Wrong with Compelled Association?, supra note 1.
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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(rendering the connection forced and inauthentic), it would
obstruct individuals’ ability to forge the sort of authentic social
connections essential for the development and maintenance of
the personality and the free intellect.
Second, the central substantive due process protections are
extensions of the values protected by freedom of speech. Sexual
intimacy, e.g., expresses and may reveal any of a variety of
mental states towards another: in the good cases, feelings of
love, affection or at least lusty attraction.
But although (free) sexual intimacy and speech are both
exercises of autonomy, both are not standard forms of
communication or transmission of mental content; hence my
remark that many substantive due process protections are
extensions of the values protected by a free speech principle,
rather than instantiations of it. A kiss typically expresses a happy
reaction, attraction, or a warm attitude, where here I mean to
invoke the sense of ‘express’ that is not synonymous with
‘communicate’ but rather that means to display and to manifest,
47
rather than just to transmit the fact of or to communicate.
Although the mental attitude may be inferred from it, the kiss is
not typically deployed merely to convey the fact of its existence.
It can be used that way but its communicative use is parasitic
upon the connotations of its expressive function.
48
This, of course, is a fraught distinction but it is one that I
think has a point that connects to two of the reasons why speech
47. Philosophers of language often use ‘expressives’ (and its cognate verb) to refer
to speech acts that do more than convey content but also manifest it in a more active,
direct way. See, e.g., John R. Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in LANGUAGE,
MIND, AND KNOWLEDGE 344 (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975), reprinted in JOHN R.
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORIES OF SPEECH ACTS 1, 15
(1979); John R. Searle, What is Language?: Some Preliminary Remarks, 11 ETHICS &
POL. 173, 181 (2009). Other speech acts may do even more, as with commissives,
performatives, and declarations. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS
32–33, 151–57 (1962); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF
LANGUAGE 57–63 (1989). By ‘communicate’ and its cognates, I mean to capture both the
transmission of content as well as the transmission of one’s (presumed and often implicit)
agreement or belief in that content. Still, despite the familiarity of this use of ‘express’ in
the philosophical literature, I couldn’t be more aware that my use of ‘express’ is not a
salutary term in a context in which ‘freedom of expression’ is right at hand and
sometimes is used interchangeably with “freedom of speech.” As the better term occurs,
so will the substitution.
48. I will not go into detail here about the various fault-lines and strengths of
different accounts of this distinction. Rubenfeld’s general discussion of the distinction is
basically sensible. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 42–44. Articulating the distinction
from the perspective of sorting regulations sensitive and insensitive to it, he asks whether
the relevant harm that a regulation targets is caused by the communicative aspect of the
expressive act or by some other element of it. I defended something like this approach in
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is special. I have argued that speech facilitates some of the core
interests of autonomous agents by rendering their mental
contents available to others and vice versa, thereby enabling
them to know one another, to cooperate with one another, to
investigate the world, and to enhance one’s understanding of our
environment and our circumstances, and thereby enabling
(though not ensuring) moral agency.
The external representation of mental content and its
communication plays an especially foundational role in
furthering these ends in large part because, in general, it is so
much more precise and informative than many of its nonessentially communicative, expressive counterparts. I mean
something here as mundane as that an explanation of the
reasons why one disapproves of another’s conduct and a
description of the emotional reactions that conduct gives rise to
conveys more content than a wordless punch in the nose. Some
content conveyed by communication cannot reliably and
accurately be conveyed through other means. With respect to
the interest in being recognized and known as the person one is
and in providing an outlet from the isolation of each mind,
curtailments on speech represent a severe incursion on this
interest because speech provides unique modes of access to the
contents of other minds. I do not mean to include only discursive
communication here: a melody or painting of the image in my
mind—a external representation of my internal visual imagery—
may convey more of my mental contents—including but not
limited to my mood—than approving or disapproving behavior;
it necessarily conveys more about my private mental contents
than silence and its visual analog.
As a general matter, regulations on the non-essentially
communicative expression, manifestation or implementation of
mental contents as such do not preclude the communication or
transmission of the mental contents they express. Restrictions on
my ability to express my anger through violence do not preclude
my transmitting my anger through communicative means: saying
I’m angry, detailing my complaints, and depicting my emotional
maelstrom through words, images, or sounds. A restriction on
the emotion’s non-essentially communicative expression does
Speech, Death, and Double Effect. Shiffrin, supra note 8. I disagree with him in thinking,
however, that governmental intent to punish or restrict communication as such is a
necessary condition of running afoul of First Amendment protections; we agree that it
may be a sufficient condition. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53
STAN. L. REV. 767, 775–78, 793–94 (2001).
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not threaten to isolate me in my mind; a restriction on
communication does.
I hasten to add that this general point is perfectly
compatible with the recognition that some forms of expression
convey more than words, images, or sounds could on certain
occasions. It may well be that, on some occasions, the depth of
my anger can only be conveyed through violent aggression. I am
neither arguing that agents have absolute rights to ensure that
(any and all) others fully understand their mental contents on all
occasions nor that externalized representations of thoughts
always convey more than behavior that acts upon those thoughts
in ways different than merely externalizing a representation.
But, by and large, speech is special because it is a uniquely
specific mechanism for the transmission of mental contents and
their discussion, evaluation, development and refinement,
independent from and prior to their implementation.
Of course, I do not deny that the transmission of mental
contents sometimes immediately affects or implements them:
directed at the relevant person, the desire to insult or, in certain
contexts, to humiliate or to subordinate can be implemented
merely by being communicated. But as a general matter,
communicative methods of transmitting mental contents
generate the possibility of an intermediate workshop-like space
in which one may experiment with, advance tentatively, or try
on, revise or reject a potential aspect or element of the self or of
one’s potential history before directly affirming it through
49
endorsement or implementation. One cannot preface one’s
thrown punch with ‘maybe’ or ‘consider the possibility’ and
thereby make the assault less of a punch in the way that
prefatory remarks will qualify a proposition subsequently
articulated so that it becomes less than a full-blown assertion.
We find both intelligible and significant our abilities effectively
to revise, clarify, or even retract what one has begun to say just
50
using further words. Whereas, I cannot revise or retract my
intentional punch by following it immediately with more
49. Nevertheless, on occasion, even purely exploratory communication of thoughts
and ideas may have moral significance and may be inappropriate to convey to some
people, however explicitly inchoate they are in form.
50. Although sometimes the further speech will have to follow on immediately to
be effective as a retraction as opposed to a later rethinking, our linguistic practice allows
us to use speech to formulate and even generate our thoughts without the first stab at
articulation rigidly gelling immediately into a final draft: we can try on an idea by
articulating it without it immediately sticking to us or representing us. Such tentativeness
is less possible with most actions (putting aside the special case of speech acts).
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violence, cringing, or even with regretful words. A further
stream of punches may clarify my assault was intentional but
beyond that rudimentary clarification, further light—why I threw
the punch—will typically require words.
The capacity of speech to be tentative and exploratory—to
allow us in a non-committal way to try on an idea, whether to
formulate it at all or to assess its plausibility or fit with oneself—
is closely related to and helps to underpin a more familiar idea
about the specialness of speech, namely that we must protect the
ability to discuss and conceive of even those actions we may
reasonably outlaw, because protecting our speech and
conception of them permits us to revisit and justify our
regulation; thereby, we may retain the ability to assess the
aptness and legitimacy of our regulation and to preserve the
ability to change course if we are mistaken.
Not all speech stops short of action and I am not arguing
there is an especially clear speech/action divide, but there are
some special features that hold generally of speech that render it
distinct from other forms of autonomous action that go beyond
revelation of mental content. These distinctive features, I
submit, play some role in explaining why speech is special and
why autonomy accounts, especially those focused on the
freedom of thought, may reasonably place a particular premium
on preserving and protecting speech.

